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The Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) is the research wing of the 
Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and specializes in the study of international 
relations, security policy, and regional studies. One of the CCC’s programs is the Project Advanced 
Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC). PASCC operates as a program planning and 
implementation office, research center, and intellectual clearinghouse for the execution of analysis 
and future-oriented studies and dialogues for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  
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The Center on Contemporary Conflict 
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BACKGROUND 
 
The eighth session of the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue was held in New Delhi, India, from 
December 12-13, 2013. The Dialogue is a Track II meeting; it is formally unofficial, but many 
participants have experience in or connections to government. The Dialogue is organized by the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Center on Contemporary Conflict and the Observer Research 
Foundation and is funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) Project on 
Advanced Systems and Concepts for Combating WMD (PASCC). The goal of this series of annual 
meetings has been to identify important elements of each side’s strategic outlook; highlight potential 
areas of cooperation; and identify possible means of overcoming problems in the U.S.-India 
relationship. Reports for the previous year’s dialogues have been published and are available on NPS 
web pages or from this report’s authors. 
 
The following pages review the proceedings of this year’s meeting by providing analysis on the panel 
presentations and ensuing discussions.  	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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 	  
THE  STATE  OF  U.S.-­‐‑INDIA  RELATIONS  
  
Participants’ assessments of U.S.-India relations were ambivalent. Most thought the relationship had 
lost much of its forward momentum. Reasons included the lack of ideas for significant future 
cooperation, inequality between the two countries, and the United States’ “transactional” treatment 
of India. Nonetheless, most participants argued that the overall picture remained positive, due to 
India and the United States’ overlapping core values and strategic interests. Despite the 
relationship’s recent lack of progress, participants pointed out that the two countries remain far 
friendlier and more cooperative with each other than they were throughout most of their histories. 
  
INDIAN/PACIFIC  OCEAN  SECURITY  AND  THE  U.S.  REBALANCE  TO  ASIA  
  
Indian participants were not sure what the U.S. Rebalance policy is or entails. They broadly believed 
that the policy did not represent a significant strategic shift for the United States, which has long 
been a major power in the Asia-Pacific region. Still, most participants believed the Rebalance is 
potentially useful as a signal that the United States will continue to provide security-related public 
goods to the region. 
  
SOUTH  ASIAN  NUCLEAR  ENVIRONMENT  
  
The Indians continue to worry about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, given its development of a tactical 
nuclear capability, as well as the danger that radical elements in the country could acquire nuclear 
materials or technology. Indian participants suggested that Pakistan’s strategy of waging 
conventional and sub-conventional warfare from behind a nuclear shield might be transferable to 
other parts of the world, such as the Middle East. Finally, the Indians expressed concern that the 
declining credibility of U.S. extended-deterrence commitments might lead some Asian states to 
contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. 
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CYBER  SECURITY  
  
Indian participants suggested that “cyber” might not be a coherent subject for discussion because it 
engages an extremely diverse set of substantive issues. The Indians also expressed frustration that 
the United States “mistreated” them in the cyber realm, refusing to share information and using U.S. 
capabilities against India. Finally, the discussion made clear that India will face an important tension 
in coming years, as it seeks to open the realm of information technology as broadly as possible for 
the purposes of economic development, while simultaneously attempting to keep the cyber realm 
secure. 
  
REGIONAL  SECURITY  ISSUES  
  
In the short term, Indian participants were most concerned about Afghanistan. They feared that the 
United States would abandon the country post-2014, leaving India to deal with increasing radicalism 
and violence in the South Asian region. The Indians’ medium-term concern was Pakistan, which 
does not pose a fundamental strategic challenge to India but could be the catalyst for a destructive 
conflict, particularly as its tactical nuclear capability develops. Over the long term, participants were 
most worried about China. They believe that Chinese growth trajectories and increasingly assertive 
behavior may undermine Indian freedom of action on its borders and in the Indian Ocean region. 
Participants argued that one way to avoid such an outcome would be through cooperation with 
other powers. 	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SECTION 1: THE OVERALL STATE OF U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS	  
 
Participants expressed considerable ambivalence regarding the trajectory of the U.S.-India 
relationship. Many believed that it had “flat-lined,” and a significant minority considered it actually 
to be in decline. They did not identify any particular reason for this deterioration, however. Indians 
raised a number of concerns, most of which centered around U.S. restrictions on the sharing of 
dual-use technology with India. Other complaints included Washington’s muddled policy in 
Afghanistan, an ambiguous Rebalance policy, and a general lack of respect on the part of the United 
States for “junior partners” in strategic relationships. These respect-oriented concerns were also 
sometimes characterized as a buyer-seller or transactional approach to U.S. relations with India, in 
which America viewed India simply as a customer, rather than as a friend.  
 
Reading between the lines, however, much of the drift in the relationship seems driven by the Indian 
government’s own lack of direction. The current government has lost credibility with the public, has 
presided over widespread corruption and economic decay, and is out of fresh ideas. Lack of progress 
with the United States is just one symptom of this broader problem. Indian participants, for their 
part, clearly stated that nothing of substance is likely to happen in the relationship until a new 
government takes power. Once that occurs, possibilities for real progress could open up once again. 
 
Overall assessments of the relationship were still fairly positive. A number of old diplomatic hands, 
who led Indian policymaking during the “bad old days” of the Cold War, reminded everyone how 
much relations had improved. Participants also emphasized the fact that the two countries’ core 
values and strategic interests still overlapped considerably – they both wanted free markets, rule of 
law, deliberative decision-making and dispute resolution, transparency, open and secure maritime 
commons, and the prevention of a single hegemon from dominating the Asia-Pacific region. 
Moreover, the Indians made clear that they view U.S. support as essential to enabling them to 
achieve these ends. While Indo-U.S. relations might not be progressing, participants believed that 
they at least remained on solid ground. Given the two countries’ history, that is no small thing. As 
one former ambassador said: “If the Indo-U.S. relationship has simply plateaued, that is actually a 
great achievement.”  
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Some specific recommendations that participants offered for moving the relationship forward in the 
relatively near future included:  
 
• Expanding the relationship’s economic foundations through increased U.S. investment in 
India’s technology sector.   
• Broadening the sweep of U.S.-India dialogue to include policy issues relating to West Asia 
and the Middle East, especially maritime security in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. 
• Expanding norm convergence between both the two countries through joint participation in 
multilateral fora such as the Australia Group.	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SECTION 2: INDIAN/PACIFIC OCEAN SECURITY AND THE REBALANCE 
 
The U.S. Rebalance policy is not well understood in India. Thus, it engendered a certain amount of 
suspicion from Indian participants at the meeting. In essence, the Indians asked: “What are the 
Americans really up to with the Rebalance and what exactly do they expect of India?” None of them 
were confident that they knew the answer, and the Americans were unable to provide many specifics 
beyond what was already known. The one thing upon which everyone agreed was that, whatever the 
strategy’s details, at the macro level the Rebalance probably did not represent a major policy shift. 
The United States has long possessed a robust presence in Asia. The new policy mostly underscored 
this presence publicly, while shifting a bit more resources to the region. Thus, in the participants’ 
view, the Rebalance had a decidedly rhetorical flavor to it. 
 
The larger question that the Rebalance raised for our Indian colleagues was how to think about the 
broad-gauge effects of U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific region. Two basic approaches emerged from 
the discussion. The majority view held that the United States serves as an essential provider of 
public-goods in the Asia-Pacific. These goods – such as an open maritime commons, secure sea lines 
of communication, and rule of law – were sustained more easily through the background security 
afforded by the United States’ military and diplomatic presence. The Rebalance could be seen as an 
assurance that this state of affairs will continue. In this view, even if the policy were largely a public-
relations exercise, it could still be important if it generated assurance and deterrence by making U.S. 
intentions more transparent. The assumption underlying the public-goods approach, then, was that 
more U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific would be better, helping to stabilize it and thereby enabling 
Washington and others to achieve the basket of public-goods they seek. Indeed, Indian participants 
speculated that, if the United States does retain the robust regional presence promised by the 
Rebalance, India together with the United States could compel any states that oppose this desired 
basket of goods to accept them as the organizing pillars of a future regional security architecture.  
 
A minority of participants took an alternative approach, which was considerably less sanguine 
regarding the likely effects of an active U.S. presence on the region. They noted that the continued 
engagement promised by the Rebalance could potentially dis-incentivize the kinds of behavior 
needed to ensure long-term stability in the Asia-Pacific. In this view, Asia is a particularly challenging 
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region to manage. The region is relatively thinly institutionalized compared to Europe and lacks the 
architecture necessary to create and maintain stable rules of conduct in such realms as security, law, 
and economics. When this institutional problem is combined with a history of deep mistrust 
between states lingering from at least World War II, the result is a very challenging regional political 
environment. Consequently, in this view, regional powers must work collectively, in good faith, to 
generate sustainable rules and institutions to smooth the way forward. In the meantime, they should 
avoid picking pointless and destabilizing fights with one another.  
 
Unfortunately, regional states may be less likely to work together in this manner if they know, or 
think they know, that the United States can be relied on to step in and defuse confrontations that 
arise in the future. Indeed, this knowledge may lead regional states to engage in needlessly 
provocative behavior, which could increase the difficulty of achieving more cooperative and stable 
relations. Adherents to this more negative view thus argued that the implications of a continued 
robust U.S. presence, as apparently promised by the Rebalance, were at best unclear. 
 
Despite the disagreement outlined above, the Indians made clear that overall they prefer the 
continued U.S. regional presence implied by the Rebalance. They believe that India stands a much 
better chance of maintaining its autonomy and resisting the emergence of a regional hegemon if it 
has U.S. help – even if that help comes only through the provision of background public goods. The 
real question, as they see it, is whether the United States will actually provide the goods that the 
Rebalance policy promises over the long term.  
 
An interesting corollary to this discussion was the claim by several participants that the standards of 
strategic behavior for a public-goods provider like the United States differed from the standards that 
hold for states benefiting from the provided goods. In this view, the United States bears a special 
burden because its actions have outsized effects on lesser powers. Specifically, in formulating policy 
toward China, the United States should be forbidden from making the same sorts of balanced 
calculations as a country like India. These calculations lead India to prepare militarily and 
diplomatically for possible confrontation with China, while also seeking to avoid needless 
provocation of the Chinese – and even seeking, where possible, joint gains through cooperation with 
China. In other words, India seeks to hedge against and engage China simultaneously. The United 
States, Indians argued, must not do this; it needs to choose a policy of either competition or 
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cooperation with China and adhere to this approach consistently. Indian participants openly 
admitted that this was a double standard, but they deemed it legitimate due to the power asymmetry 
between the United States and countries like India.  
 
A number of other points broadly related to maritime security emerged from the discussion. They 
included the following:  
 
• Participants argued that Indian maritime strategy was based mostly on the country’s 
economic interests and focused on sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection eastward 
and westward. India’s westward maritime interests are particularly compelling, as the Indian 
economy relies upon unfettered commerce and energy flows through the Persian Gulf and 
Strait of Hormuz. A number of participants maintained that Persian Gulf maritime security 
could be a fruitful avenue for U.S.-India cooperation.  
• Indian participants said that they viewed the Western Pacific as an area of relatively 
hardcore, balance-of-power security equations. They viewed the Indian Ocean, by contrast, 
as a region characterized more by non-traditional security issues such as piracy and disaster 
relief.  	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SECTION 3: THE ASIAN NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT 
 
Indian participants voiced serious concerns regarding Pakistan’s nuclear posture. Particularly 
worrisome issues were the introduction of tactical weapons into the Pakistani force structure, which 
thereafter lower the threshold for nuclear use on the subcontinent, and the danger of radical 
elements seizing nuclear weapons or materials, especially given what the Indians see as the increased 
Islamization of Pakistan’s military.  
 
Much of the discussion focused on the implications of South Asia’s nuclear experience for other 
parts of the world, such as the Middle East. Participants argued that predictions about the likely 
impact of proliferation on Iran, which was one of the most urgent security questions facing the 
international community, might be informed by a study on the debate regarding the impact of 
nuclear weapons in South Asia. One side of this debate holds that a “Cold War” or “rational 
deterrence theory” model applies to the South Asian case. According to this model, the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by competing states is likely to stabilize their security relationship. This 
stabilization occurs because nuclearization threatens to make any war between the states 
catastrophically costly. They will therefore do everything possible to avoid conflict with each other. 
In South Asia, this logic induced caution on the part of decision-makers in New Delhi and 
Islamabad and resulted in a less antagonistic relationship than existed before the two sides acquired 
nuclear weapons. And this development, in turn, suggests that we should not worry a great deal 
about proliferation in the Middle East; it is likely to have a similarly cautionary effect on states in the 
region. 
 
The other side of the debate contends that what we might call a “Pakistan” model of nuclear 
weapons proliferation holds in South Asia. This model maintains that the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons can incentivize destabilizing behavior on the part of newly nuclear states. Nuclear weapons 
can have this effect because they create a shield from behind which dissatisfied states can challenge 
the status quo using conventional or sub-conventional assets. The Pakistanis have perfected this 
strategy, using a combination of non-state actors and nuclear weapons to undermine the South 
Asian territorial status quo, thereby creating an extremely challenging and unresolved compellence 
problem for India. If this dynamic repeats itself with Iran, the consequences could be dire.  
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Although Indian strategists generally argue that nuclear weapons in South Asia pose no great 
security concerns, dialogue participants believed that there was a very good chance that the 
“Pakistan” model outlined above could apply to the Middle East. If this were the case, a new nuclear 
power could be emboldened to destabilize the region using non-state actors from behind the shield 
of nuclear weapons. Though they were loath to state outright that Middle Eastern should not be 
allowed to acquire a nuclear capability, Indian participants clearly believed that such an occurrence 
would not be in their interest. 
 
Finally, participants spent considerable time discussing U.S. extended-deterrence commitments to 
states in Asia. The Indians argued that the credibility of these commitments was weakening for a 
host of reasons including perceived U.S. war-weariness, fiscal disarray, conciliatory behavior toward 
China, and commitments to reduce significantly the size of America’s nuclear arsenal. Indian 
participants worried that this erosion of U.S. credibility would increase many Asian states’ security 
concerns, making nuclear weapons appear more attractive to them. A number of Indians said that 
such fears could lead Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own. This, they 
said, could broadly weaken non-proliferation norms and lead to the further spread of nuclear 
weapons in Asia and elsewhere.  
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SECTION 4: COMMON GOALS AND THREATS IN CYBER SECURITY 
	  
This discussion opened by questioning whether cyber security was even a coherent subject of study. 
Participants suggested that, rather than lump multiple diverse issue areas under the broad category 
of cyber, analysts might do better to disaggregate them and address each individually. If so, cyber 
was actually a subset of more traditional issues, such as development, sovereignty, legal jurisdiction, 
compellence, deterrence, and criminal law.  
 
Indian participants spent considerable time criticizing the United States’ cyber behavior. Specific 
grievances included the use of cyber capabilities to spy on India; U.S. companies allowing their 
technology to be used by the public in ways that incited communal violence; senior officials of U.S. 
technology companies lacking respect for India; and U.S. failure adequately to share information 
gleaned from its technical collection capabilities with India. 
 
The discussion revealed that the Indians would soon face an important tension in their plans for the 
cyber domain. Participants explained that the Indian government plans to use the Internet as an 
engine of economic development, bringing goods and services to a wide swath of people who 
otherwise would lack them. This will require deep cyber penetration of the country; the government 
hopes to move from today’s 12-15% of the population online to 80% in coming years. In order to 
do so, the Indians plan to open up cyber space, while imposing only minimal regulations on 
participants; they do not expect to combat threats such as fraud and piracy, or to protect rights such 
as privacy and security, in a particularly vociferous manner.  
 
Participants stated that although this openness will create opportunities, it will also give rise to 
problems, potentially disincentivizing businesses from participating in the Indian cyber-economy, 
undermining national security, and putting individual consumers at risk. How can India use a free 
and open cyber domain to promote broad-based economic development while maintaining the 
controls necessary to ensure reasonable protection of national security interests as well as privacy 
and property rights? Indian participants argued that their government had yet to square this circle. In 
their view, this dilemma was likely to represent India’s biggest challenge in the cyber realm over the 
next decade. 
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Other points that emerged from the cyber discussion included the following: 
• A number of Indian participants expressed a desire to forge a “relationship of equals” with 
the United States in the realm of cyber. Others pointed out that this would be unlikely in the 
near-to-medium term owing to India's relative dearth of cyber capabilities.  
• India and the United States share a number of interests in the cyber realm, creating possible 
opportunities for cooperation. For example, foreign cyber penetration and industrial 
espionage pose a serious threat to India and the United States alike, both from national 
defense and economic perspectives. The Indians know penetrations occur, yet, to an extent, 
they remain unsure of exactly how and what is targeted. Washington and New Delhi, 
therefore, have common cause to champion intellectual property rights and develop 
protective measures. Cooperation on these issues could help to propel the stagnant U.S.-
India relationship forward.  
• Some participants suggested that India’s willingness to downplay revelations from the 
Edward Snowden affair indicated an Indian willingness to cooperate with the United States 
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SECTION 5: INDIA’S REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES 
	  
Indian participants’ most immediate regional security concern is the future of Afghanistan; they are 
extremely worried about the fate of the country post-2014. Indians fear that the United States will 
abandon Afghanistan, enabling it to be re-Talibanized. If this occurs, they believe that Afghanistan 
will become a hotbed of Islamism; that it will export radical ideologies and terrorist violence 
throughout South Asia; and that India will lose its considerable investments in Afghan development. 
Indian participants were adamant that, regardless of the specifics in India’s post-2014 policy, the 
United States should maintain a robust presence in Afghanistan and properly equip the Afghan 
national army. In addition, they suggested that the United States should cooperate with Iran on 
managing Afghanistan, since the Iranians share America’s interest in preventing the country from 
being re-Talibanized.  
 
Participants also expressed considerable concern regarding Pakistan. Unlike China, Pakistan does 
not pose a long-term strategic threat to India. Nonetheless, the Indians maintained that it remains a 
dangerous problem. Pakistan-based terrorism continues to take a toll on India and could trigger a 
military confrontation at any time. The country’s nuclear arsenal also worries India, particularly given 
Pakistan’s political instability, which increases the potential for a loss of physical control over, or 
unauthorized access to, nuclear weapons. Indian participants also pointed out that Pakistan’s 
development of tactical nuclear capabilities would lower the threshold for nuclear use on the 
subcontinent, increasing the likelihood that any conventional conflict between India and Pakistan 
escalates to the nuclear level. 
 
According to most participants, without deep internal social and political change, the situation in 
Pakistan is unlikely to improve. If such fundamental change does occur, however, they said that 
Pakistan might be salvageable. Pakistanis could decide to abandon their quest to acquire Kashmir; 
renounce praetorianism; cease support for Islamist militancy; and focus their efforts on internal 
development and the creation of a strengthened civil society. Unfortunately, the Indians argued, 
nobody knows how to institute such deep internal change – especially since the Pakistanis 
themselves do not seem to want it. Participants noted that the recent election of Nawaz Sharif, 
though heartening since it marked Pakistan’s first democratic transition, held little potential in this 
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regard. According to the Indians, Sharif has long harbored Islamist tendencies and strongly 
supported Pakistan’s campaign of asymmetric warfare against India. Thus, even the most promising 
internal developments are unlikely to have a significant positive effect on Pakistan. 
 
The Indians identified China as their main, long-term strategic challenge. They worried about China 
because: 1) Chinese growth trajectories indicate that the country will remain well ahead of India in 
every indicator of power for the foreseeable future; 2) China has grown increasingly assertive with its 
neighbors – for example in the South China Sea and on the Indian border; and 3) the Chinese do 
not seem to value the public goods that India desires for the region, such as rule of law, deliberative 
dispute resolution, and open access to international commons. The Indians readily admitted that 
they would not be able to resist this hegemonic growth on their own; they will be able to do so only 
in cooperation with other powers, including the United States.  
 
Indian participants argued that India’s main strategic goal was regional primacy. They defined this as 
freedom of action in the Indian Ocean region and the absence of any serious security challenges on 
their borders. Some U.S. participants suggested that the Indians’ position was somewhat paradoxical. 
The term “primacy,” they argued, generally has a unilateralist flavor to it – a state enjoying primacy 
sits alone atop a system or region without significant support or assistance from others. The 
discussion made clear, however, that cooperation was central to India’s notion of regional primacy. 
The Indians realized that they lacked the means to achieve primacy on their own. They would need 
help to do so, and their main collaborator was likely to be the United States.  
 
U.S. participants suggested that this situation might mean that India was not really seeking primacy. 
Instead, the Indians might actually want some limited form of collective security, where the pool of 
players was kept small, in order to reduce collective action problems and ensure a relatively close 
overlap of interests between players. If this were the case, India might need to think differently 
about primacy, as well as issues like autonomy, asymmetry, and collective burden sharing. Indian 
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SECTION 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 	  
U.S.-India relations appear to have reached a plateau, with no major joint projects, or other 
initiatives for advancing the relationship, currently in progress. That plateau, however, is at a much 
higher level of cooperation than the two countries enjoyed in the past. Also, important potential 
areas of collaboration lie on the horizon, particularly the need to manage rising Chinese power in the 
Indian/Pacific Ocean regions. Both countries agree on the importance of this challenge and seek 
similar outcomes. The major question moving forward is whether the U.S. and India can be 
confident in each other as partners in this and other issue areas. India must be confident that the 
United States will be steadfast in its commitment to remain actively engaged in Asia. The United 
States must be confident that India will shoulder collective burdens and view its strategic situation 
realistically. Each side will need to demonstrate to the other that it can deliver on these issues if the 
relationship is to enjoy significant further progress. It may be worth expending some effort in the 
future to identifying ways in which such reassurance might occur. 
 
Culture is another area that deserves further attention and might be best viewed as a “spoiler” in the 
context of U.S.-India relations. On multiple occasions during the dialogue, participants argued that 
misunderstandings rooted in  “culture” – the habits and norms that determine how Indians and 
Americans communicate, deliberate, and sometimes disagree with each other – often undermined 
the two-countries’ ability to achieve important, mutually beneficial goals. Does culture really have 
such an independent effect on U.S.-India relations? Or are problems that we blame on culture 
actually caused by substantive disagreements, which are rooted in genuine misalignments of interest? 
If culture does matter, is it sufficiently powerful to damage a strategic relationship that both 
countries have identified as one of their most important? What are some ways in which we can 
lower the likelihood of culture-based misunderstandings between the two sides in the future? 
Culture was not an official topic of discussion during this meeting. But given the subject’s 
importance, as indicated by the interest of participants, as well as by recent high-profile diplomatic 
spats between the United States and India, such as the Devyani Khobragade episode, it may be a 
worthy subject for study in a later dialogue. In particular, it might be useful to identify some 
behavioral norms or practices that could help both sides avoid culture-related problems in the 
future. 
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Finally, patience is essential as the United States and India attempt to move their relationship 
forward. In addition to the many challenges discussed above, other issues substantively unrelated to 
Indo-U.S. relations can have a significant impact on their progress. Probably the most important 
such issue at present is India’s own internal politics. As noted earlier, the current government is not 
in a position to pursue any new policy initiatives. Much of the current slack in the U.S.-India 
relationship probably results from this fact. India will elect a new government in the spring of 2014. 
With this government, Washington is likely to see renewed energy, fresh ideas and the possibility for 
further Indo-U.S. progress. Until then, the two countries should probably be content with the 
existing plateau in their relations. 
  
